And it explores their implications for Western, particularly European, policy. It seeks to identify which trends are fading or deepening – which are fleeting or longer-term. This paper describes the forces that shape Russia’s long-term view of China. One can already observe how Russia’s younger China experts are much more vigilant about Beijing’s policies than some of their older colleagues. Russian policymakers’ generally relaxed attitude might now be slowly changing, as China flexes its muscles and they learn more about their neighbour. And it is no accident that Russia’s security services employ very little Chinese technology. Russia is careful to keep China at arm’s length on sensitive policy issues. At the same time, Moscow’s trust in Beijing is measured. This might be thanks to Russia’s still-significant military superiority, or the presence of some residual beliefs from Soviet times, when the state media routinely portrayed China as a ‘younger brother’ and a less developed country. Russia’s policymakers and society do not fear China in the way that many countries in the West and China’s neighbourhood do. For now, Russia’s thinking about China is best described as an amalgam of many different trends – which vary in their significance, longevity, and vitality. The causes of these shifts are multifaceted: they include the changing nature of China’s behaviour, the West’s relations with Russia and China, economic concerns, leaders’ personalities, fundamental security interests, covid-19, the global drive towards green energy, generational change, and Russia’s growing interest in its big neighbour (which, for a long time, barely appeared on the mental map of Russian policymaking elites). Russia’s view of China, in particular, has undergone remarkable shifts in a short time – and continues to do so. But both these narratives ignore much of the thinking of Russian and Chinese policymakers, as well as many of the forces that shape the Russia-China relationship. Some analysts see them as forming an “alliance of autocracies” others as a “bad marriage” that Russia is desperate to escape. They often view the two countries as either a de facto alliance that the West needs to contain or as a target for a ‘reverse Kissinger’ – an effort to draw Russia away from China. Western politicians sometimes talk of China and Russia as if they were pieces in a Lego set: fixed in shape, and easy to handle. While the West does not have an opportunity to prompt a policy U-turn in Moscow that divides Russia and China, it could give Russia space to hedge against China in key areas such as advanced technology.The Kremlin’s thinking on China is an amalgam of quickly developing trends that will determine Russia’s position in a world shaped by the US-China rivalry.

Neither of these outcomes is likely in the short term: Russia has many reasons to maintain a cordial relationship with China, while policymakers in Moscow view rapprochement with the West as impossible or too politically costly.Western policymakers are now asking whether Russia and China will join forces in an alliance of autocracies, and whether they have a chance to manage this challenge by drawing Moscow away from Beijing.

We need to go deeper deep sea diplomats